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ABSTRACT

In an attempt to gain a better perspective on the relationship between education and the modern state, this paper reopens the theoretical debate on the key role of formal rationality in Max Weber's interpretation of the capitalist economy and the modern bureaucratic state. Against the background of an extensive review of the development and the theoretical properties of the notion of formal rationality (as exemplified in legal authority), it is argued that the very achievement of formal rationality in social institutuons tends to undermine the rationality and autonomy of individual action and participation. The modern bureaucratic state is seen as a conspicuous and inevitable case in point; educational institutions, in emphasizing the importance of technical, specialized knowledge, come increasingly under the influence of bureaucratic norms of formal rationality. As a result, equal educational opportunity finds itself reduced to equal powerlessness in the face of bureaucratic social apparatuses. At the same time, however, education is still capable of playing an important critical role by shedding the light of scientific inquiry on the precarious foundations of the legitimacy of modern relations of domination. (Author)

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

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ON LEGAL AUTHORITY, CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY AND SCHOOLING IN THE WRITINGS OF MAX WEBER

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Translated from German by Ray Meyer

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Abstract

In an attempt to gain a better perspective on the relationship between education and the modern state, the paper re-opens the theoretical debate on the key role of formal rationality in Max Weber's interpretation of the capitalist economy and the modern bureaucratic state. Against the background of an extensive review of the development and the theoretical properties of the notion of formal rationality (as exemplified in legal authority), it is argued that the very achievement of formal rationality in social institutions tends to undermine the rationality and autonomy of individual action and participation. The modern bureaucratic state is seen as a conspicuous and inevitable case in point; educational institutions, in emphasizing the importance of technical, specialized knowledge, come increasingly under the influence of bureaucratic norms of formal rationality. As a result, equal educational opportunity finds itself reduced to equal powerlessness in the face of bureaucratic social apparatuses. At the same time, however, education is still capable of playing an important critical role by shedding the light of scientific inquiry on the precarious foundations of the legitimacy of modern relations of domination.

I. INTRODUCTION

In his analysis of Western societies Max Weber uses the concept bureaucratization. Implicit in this concept are three principle theoretical perspectives, one of which is the sociology of the bureaucratic organization of private firms and public institutions. It is in this interpretation that the concept of bureaucracy has received the most attention and has given rise to innumerable theoretical and empirical investigations. For Weber, however, bureaucratization is a macro-sociological concept, too. For it refers also to the economy as a whole and to the structure of political domination in the society as a whole. Thirdly, the concept of bureaucratization stands for a theory of social development, more precisely, a theory of the development of modern Western societies.

The theory of bureaucratic organization is so well known that there is no need to present it again here. Therefore, my discussion will focus on Weber's theory of capitalist development.

Weber's sociological approach lends itself as well as could be wished to an investigation of social legitimacy and crises of legitimacy. For his sociology concerns itself with the interpretive understanding of social action, and for Weber that means human action with which the actors associate a specific subjective meaning (Weber, 1978, p. 2). The question of this subjective meaning of social action guides, in all parts of his work, Weber's construction of conceptual ideal types, in his sociology of economy as well as in his sociology of religion and law, and, as is well known, also in his sociology of legitimate domination, which is of special importance for our topic.

Among the different elements, which together constitute legitimate domination, Weber ascribes the greatest significance to legitimacy. Every form of domination, according to Weber, seeks to establish and cultivate belief in its legitimacy. For those subject to domination, the type legitimacy determines the type of their obedience. To this belief in the legitimacy of domination corresponds on the other side of the relationship, on the side of those exercising domination, the kind of administrative apparatus by means of which domination is effected and obedience enforced. Therefore, Weber concludes, it is advisable to distinguish the types of domination according to the kind of legitimacy claimed. Since the legitimacy of modern relationships of domination is central to this sociology, Weber's investigations of the development of capitalism, lead most directly to the question which concerns us here, the question of crises of legitimacy.

Weber describes the development of modern Western societies as a process of increasing rationalization. The social structure of this progress consists in the bureaucratization of all social and economic relations, and this increasing bureaucratization deprives the individual of ever more possibilities of personal autonomy. In explicit agreement with Marxism, Weber describes the process of bureaucratization as the increasing expropriation from the workers of their control over the means of their lives. In disagreement with Marxism, however, Weber maintains that the roots of this expropriation of control are not to be found in private ownership of the means of production, and he furthermore categorically rejects the Marxist hope that the workers ever could win the control over their lives. For private ownership of the means of production is not the cause of expropriation, rather it is itself merely a manifestation of a tendency of historical

development, a tendency older than capitalsim and which is not limited to the economic sphere. Thus, according to Weber, the increasing expropriation from individuals of their power to dispose over the circumstances of their lives is more correctly described as a process of bureaucratization. In a speech on socialism he stated, "it is especially...this unescapable, universal bureaucratization which lies concealed behind one of the most often quoted socialist catchwords, 'the separation of the worker from the means of production'" (SSP, p. 498, trans. R. M.).

II. THE CONCEPT OF 'ZWECKRATIONALITÄT'

According to Weber, bureaucratization is the expression of the all-pervading advance of the specific Western rationality. Let us consider what he meant by this assertion. The guiding thread of Weber's analysis of the specifically Western way of life is his concept of 'Zweckrationalität'. This concept has been translated as 'instrumental rationality'. This translation is, however, an interpretation, which is not consonant with Weber's theory. It renders only one of the two dimensions of the meaning which Weber has in mind. In his discussion of the methodological foundations of sociology Weber offers the following definition:

> Action is 'zweckrational' when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends. Determination of action either in affectual or in traditional terms is thus incompatible with this type (of social action) (ES, p. 26, amended to omit the translation of 'zweckrational' by 'instrumentally rational', R. M.).

It is obvious, that the concept of instrumental rationality refers only to the selection of means to given ends, and that Weber addresses in addition

a specific procedure of defining ends. With regard to the definition of ends 'Zweckrationalität' means rationality of ends, which is not of an instrumental character.

The notion of 'rational action' is the conceptual point of departure for Weber's sociology. One reason for this choice is that this point of departure suits the method of Weber's sociology which aims at an interpretive understanding of social action. It is especially easy for the observer to arrive at an understanding of rational action, as it confronts him neither with irrational and hence obscure affects of the observed actors, nor with adherence to values which are alien to the observer and thus not immediately understandable for him. Therefore Weber chose 'Zweckrationalität' as the guiding principle for this construction of ideal-types of social action. These ideal-types serve as analytic tools. The method of Weber's sociology is to compare empirical events with these ideal-types, and where the empirical reality in question does not correspond to the ideal-type, that reality is described and analyzed in terms of its deviation from the conceptual construction.

However, the significance of the concept of 'Zweckrationalität' is not exhausted by its methodological usefulness. Just as importantly, it connects the values directing Weber's investigations with certain aspects of the object of these investigations. Briefly summarized, Weber's considerations are the following ones: The exhaustive causal explanation of any empirical phenomenon is not only practically impossible, but moreover would be an endeavor which hardly makes sense. Such a causal explanation is practically impossible because the causes associated with the individuality of a social phenomenon are far too numerous and various. Into this chaos order

is brought by the circumstance that in every case only a part of the particular social reality is of interest and significance for us, because only that part stands in relation to the cultural values with which we approach social reality. What the observer considers meaningful from among the multiplicity of events of which the human world consists, and what he therefore takes as the object of sociological investigation, depends on his own values, values which do not arise from the object of investigation (Weber, 1949).

From Weber's above-noted definition of rational action is to be understood that for him 'Zweckrationalität' means the ability of an individual to set ends for himself autonomously and to realize these ends by the mobilization of means in a way appropriate for achieving them. With the terms emotional, affectual, traditional, value-rational, and rational action Weber designates types of action which form a continuum of increasing personal autonomy and intellectual self-assurance. Strictly traditional behavior, like affectual behavior, "lies very close to the borderline of what can justifiably be called meaningfully oriented action" (Weber, 1978, p. 25).

> The orientation of value-rational action is distinguished from the affectual type by its clearly self-conscious formulation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values. At the same time the two types have a common element, namely that the meaning of the action does not lie in the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake, (Weber, 1978, p. 25).

In other words, an actor behaves in a value-rational manner when he adheres to guidelines established in the described way without considering the results of his action, in short, when he acts ethically according to ultimate ethical principles, whether these be religious, political, or other.

Consideration of ends attains its highest degree in 'zweckrational' action, which is differentiated from the other types of social action by this characteristic. Accordingly, an actor behaves in a 'zweckrational' manner, not when he only organizes means with regard to ends, but rather when he also sets his ends in consideration of the circumstances in which he finds himself, as well as in consideration of alternative, competing ends and their results. In brief, an actor behaves in a 'zweckrational' manner when he sets his ends reflectively, without constraint or encroachment on his personal autonomy by blind affect or unexamined authority. Should the choice among competing ends be made according to value-rational criteria, then the action oriented to the chosen end is 'zweckrational' only in selection and organization of means to that end. Weber also envisages another situation, however:

> On the other hand, the actor may, instead of deciding between alternative and conflicting ends in terms of a rational orientation to a system of values, simply take them as given subjective wants and arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency. He may then orient his action to this scale in such a way that they are satisfied as far as possible in order of urgency, as formulated in the principle of 'marginal utility' (ES, p. 26).

The concept of 'Zweckrationalität' has, then, two dimensions of meaning, one of them referring to the mode in which ends are set. Luhmann fails to understand that ends can be set in a 'zweckrational' manner, and so attempts a 'clarifying correction', being of the opinion that the distinction between value-rational and zweckrational action does not illuminate "with ultimate clarity the orientational structure of rational action" (Luhmann, p. 37, trans. R. M.). As Luhmann interprets Weber, the distinction between value-rational and zweckrational action expresses only that not all action is oriented to ends, and that not all ends are set according

to value-rationality, rather some are also affectually determined or determined by tradition. Luhmann thus overlooks the decisive difference between the two concepts in question. He overlooks that ends can also be determined in a rational manner, that means on the basis of personal autonomy and self-assurance. To say that someone sets his ends in a 'zweckrational' manner does not mean that his behavior is affectually impoverished, nor that he behaves opportunistically with respect to value orientations. Such an assertion means, rather, that the person in question can maintain autonomy vis-à-vis his affects, and knows that the norms and convictions which he acknowledges and to which he adheres have been established by humans and have no authority other than human. This rationality of action is obviously not of solely instrumental nature and hence it would be incorrect to call it, and to understand it as, 'instrumental rationality.'

The other dimension of the meaning of rationality refers to the organization of means. Means can be differentially rational. In this respect Zweckrationalität means instrumental rationality. It would be a mistake to understand Weber's concept of instrumental rationality in the sense of a technocratic ideology, according to which a purely technical and non-social progress determines monocausally all other spheres of life and behavioral orientations. A victim of this misunderstanding is, for example, Marcuse, who maintains, presumably in criticism of Weber that not technical constraints, but social relations undermine the individuals' autonomy (Marcuse, 1965).

This interpretation of the Weberian concept of rationalization, however, must be rejected for a number of reasons. First of all, it is not even remotely Weber's intention to present the means and the process of

production as an apparatus determined by non-social constraints. He rather emphasizes the social character of technical rationality. The quality of technical means is according to Weber conditioned by social relations. Technology develops according to a criterion of rationality which is social in nature, and this criterion of development is not applied ex post facto, but is embodied in the products of technological development from the outset. Modern technological progress receives its orientation from what the market will approve as the profits and costs of production. "But," adds Weber, "however fundamental it has been, this economic orientation has by no means stood alone in affecting the development of technology....None the less, the main emphasis at all times, and especially the present, has lain in the economic determination of technological development" (ES, p. 67). By technology Weber understands the "question" of the most rational means for particular ends. The examination of productive processes and means of production from this point of view is itself first achieved by the process of rationalization. For instance, instrumental rationality is unknown to the traditional orientation of work, which clings almost thoughtlessly to received practices.

Another reason why the theory of rationalization is not a technologist theory of development is that Weber, in opposition to certain Marxist positions, dismisses any monocausal model of social development. In criticism of Marxism, he "protests" against the claim that anything, be it technology or be it economy, is the 'ultimate' or 'definitive' or 'true' cause of something else (Weber, 1944).

Accordingly, Weber does not have the slightest intention to attribute exclusively to religious ideas a determinative role with respect to social

development. That he investigates the connection between the 'spirit of capitalism' and the Protestant ethic, once represented and embodied by the bourgeoisie, does not mean that he wants to oppose to an economist explanation of social development an equally one-sided explanation provided by the sociology of religion. Rather, he is examining one side of the causal relation without denying the significance of the other: what Marxism considers accidental or as appertaining to the dependent superstructure constitutes an element of the conduct of life that also enters into economic activity. Weber stresses that the particularity of modern Western rationalism can be grasped in its specificity only if "above all" its economic conditions are taken into consideration (Weber, 1958, Introduction). He describes capitalism as a "most fateful" power, because from the outset it developed along the path of a rational way of life. It is in the form of the capitalist economy that this rationalization of life which is characteristic of the Occident has its most serious consequences. Industrial production on a large scale forms an 'apparatus,' which, "as it is at the present time, and with the effects it has, has changed the spiritual countenance of humanity until it is almost unrecognizable, and will continue to change it" (Weber, 1924, p. 60, trans. R. M.).

The 'disenchantment' of the world, the dissolution of the values and of meaningful social relations maintained by tradition, allows the preconditions to arise for the individual's autonomy. Weber's central thesis is that the process of rationalization which creates these preconditions at the same time undermines the realization of this possibility of individual autonomy. In the economy, the public sphere and government, the institutional structures which are a necessary pre-condition of

individual freedom develop a dynamic that annuls this freedom. Let us consider Weber's analysis of this dialectic of the rationalization process in more detail, making use of his sociology of economy and domination.

III. ZWECKRATIONALITÄT AND THE FORMAL-RATIONAL CHARACTER OF LEGAL AUTHORITY

The rationality of behavioral orientations, the most advanced form of which is Zweckrationalität, is the point of view from which Weber investigates the types of legitimate domination. The continuum of increasing rationality, formed by the concepts of emotional, affectual, traditional, value-rational and zweckrational orientation of action, appears, with slight modification, also in his investigation of legitimate domination.

The most rational form of legitimate domination is, for Weber, the legal form. The validity of its legitimacy is of a rational character because it is founded on belief in the legality of consciously enacted formal rules. By contrast, the established belief in the sanctity of traditions, obtaining since time immemorial and so unexamined, as well as devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him are bases for less rational beliefs of legitimacy. Charismatic, traditional, and legal authority, then, form a continuum of increasing rationality. This continuum is meant by Weber to be a conceptual construction for heuristic purposes rather than an empirical description of social development (Weber, 1978, p. 215).

Legal authority rests on the acceptance of certain mutually inter-dependent ideas pertaining to patterns of political decision making, in contrast with the substantive contents and ends of decisions. A system of

domination which prescribed certain values of substantive character with fixed content would stand on contradiction to a rational (zweckrational) action-orientation, implicit in which is openness to any and all enlightened interests. This desideratum of openness is met by formal legal authority. This type of authority is based, inter alia, on the idea that any legal norm may be intentionally established with a claim to obedience from the members of a delimitable body of people; further, that the law consists essentially in a consistent system of abstract rules; that the administration of law consists in the application of these rules to particular cases; that political administration proceeds within limits set by legal precepts and follows principles which are capable of generalized formulation, and which are approved in the order governing the group in question; and finally, that the person who obeys authority does so only in his capacity as a 'member' of the organization, and what he obeys is 'the law,' not the personal will of the superior, and he thus has an obligation of obedience only within the sphere of a rationally demarcated jurisdiction (ibid., p. 217-218). The rationality of the law is, then, formal, and its development takes place in abstraction from substantive ends.

Formal rationalization, as Weber defines, aims at achieving "the highest degree of formal juridical precision which would maximize the chances for the correct prediction of legal consequences and for the rational systematization of law and procedure." Substantive rationalization, by contrast, tries to find a type of law "which is most appropriate to the expediential and ethical goals of the authorities in question" (ibid., p. 810). The formal rationality of the law thus corresponds to the orientation of the zweckrational type of action, inasmuch as it determines decision

making processes which permit the pursuit of any end. The formal rationality of the law also keeps the system of authority open to the mobilization of any effective means for the realization of ends. For that reason legal formal rationality also permits the greatest degree of technical efficiency. Now the highest degree of such efficiency is attained by the "monocratic variety of bureaucracy," of which Weber asserts that it is,

> from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks (ibid., p. 223).

Yet, according to Weber, the rationality of modern legal authority develops in such a way that for the members of a bureaucratic organization, and the citizens in general, rational action is reduced to passive conformity. Under these conditions the rationality of the meaning which the individuals assign to their behavior falls back to stages in the development of rationality far below the level designated by the concept of Zweckrationalität.

The primary threat to the rationality of legal authority does not consist in the success of interest groups in institutionalizing in the legal system substantive values or points of view and thereby forcing a breach in the system's formal rationality, although this also happens. In this connection Weber adduces the propertyless masses, whose specific interest, in contrast with those of the propertied bourgeoisie, are little served by formal equality before the law and calcuable adjudication and administration. Their interest in the equalization of economic and social life-

opportunities vis-à-vis the propertied classes leads them to use justice and administration in the service of substantive goals in a way that is necessarily prejudicial to the formal character of the law (ibid., p. 980).

The primary threat to the rationality of legal authority does not come from these substantive interests; it is not, Weber maintains, external but rather internal to that rationality. At all levels, from the highest echelon of government to the bureaucratic apparatus and down to those governed, formal rationality, the precondition of a rational action-orientation, undermines rational behavior in the course of the very process of rationalization. The reason for this destruction of rationality is that with the spread of bureaucratization the masses' belief in the legitimacy of authority regresses to become belief in charismatic authority. In addition, the behavior of the personnel of the expanding bureaucracies has a substantively heteronomous orientation. This tendency to a relative irrationality does not have its immediate source in the formal nature of legality, but rather in substantive constraints inherent in modern legal authority. A closer analysis of Weber's concept of legal authority will make this clear.

The concept of legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative apparatus comprehends a number of forms of authority, which are all legal, but differ in the degree of rationality of the foundations for their legitimacy. Legal authority, according to Weber's definition, rests, inter alia, on acceptance of the idea "that any given legal norm may be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or value-rationality or both" (ibid., p. 217). The legality of the positive enactments constituting a social order may, then, be treated by those participating in the social order as legitimate because it is based on voluntary agreement or

because "it is imposed by an authority which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets with compliance" (ibid., p. 36). Of these two principal forms of legal authority only one has a basis whose legitimacy is of a rational (zweckrational) nature.

This type of legal authority is founded on the voluntary agreement, guided by their interests, of autonomous individuals who create for themselves a social order without recognizing any authority outside of themselves. Weber did not go on to examine this variety of legal authority, however, not only because there would have been no empirical instances to which this ideal type could have been applied, but also because he thought that under modern conditions such a form of authority was impossible. As for modern legal authority, characterized by imposition of legal norms, Weber believed that under this form of domination the rationality of the belief in its legitimacy would inevitably regress to low levels of rationality. The legitimacy to which those imposing legal norms can lay claim varies over a certain range. So far as compliance is not merely derived from fear or from motives of expediency, willingness to submit to an imposed order rests empirically on a "mixture of adherence to tradition and belief in legality." Very often the actors subject to a given order "are, of course, not even aware how far it is a matter of custom, of convention, or of law" (ibid., p. 37,38). If one considers that Weber says of the traditional type of behavior, the unquestioning orientation to received customs, that it can just barely be called meaningfully oriented action, then it becomes clear that the legitimacy of the social group imposing an order, and hence the legitimacy of this order itself, are of a very low level of rationality.

Also of less than maximal rationality is the behavioral orientation of bureaucratic personnel. It is not zweckrational, for bureaucrats do not act in accordance with their own interests, nor according to their own judgment on the appropriateness of a procedure in a particular case. Instead, their action is guided by a specific sense of duty, which forbids just such considerations (ibid., p. 1404). It is not only the bureaucrat's duty, but also a point of honor for him to carry out orders as if they were in conformity with his deepest convictions, even when in his opinion the orders are wrong. Bureaucrats' behavior, then, has a substantively heteronomous orientation, just as the behavior of industrial workers does.

The imposition of a legal order by force thus constitutes a breach through which enter into society at all levels behavioral orientations which must be regarded as irrational when measured against the degree of rationalization designated by the concept of Zweckrationalität. This intrusion of scarcely rational orientations of action into the social fabric elicits criticism from Weber again and again. He saw the bureaucratic organization of social and economic life, together with modern technology,

> busy fabricating the shell of bondage which men will perhaps be forced to inhabit some day, as powerless as the fellahs of ancient Egypt. This might happen <u>if</u> a technically superior administration <u>were to be the ultimate and sole value</u> in the ordering of their affairs, and that means: a rational bureaucratic administration with corresponding welfare benefits" (ibid., p. 1402), emphasis by Weber).

Efficiency and calculability of social institutions are at work eroding the ends and the values for which they should be no more than means, and without which they are meaningless.

To counteract the reification of social institutions Weber proposes the cultivation of charismatic authority: in the economic sphere the autonomous

capitalist entrepreneur is to constitute a countervailing force to the might of governmental bureaucracies. For on the basis of his disposition over material resources the latter is capable and interested, more than anyone else, to serve as a bastion against an expanding bureaucracy (ibid., p. 225).

As for Weber's position on the political system, he argued for parliamentarism and a plebiscitary "Führerdemokratie," characterized in general by devotion to and trust in the charisma of the leader. Thus the affective belief of the masses in the personal qualities of leaders becomes a component of the legitimacy of modern Western systems of authority.

Weber's commitment to plebiscitary 'Führerdemokratie' can be correctly understood only when one takes into consideration that with this conception of government he was taking a stand against the pre-first world-war authoritarian German State (Obrigkeitsstaat) and for parliamentarism. The parliamentary struggle is to be the locus of selection and training for political leaders. The behavioral orientation which political leaders should cultivate is diametrically opposite to the specific ethos of office which is typical for bureaucrats. And what is important for Weber is precisely that such political qualifications of caesarist dictators can develop into a force that would combat the pervasively paralyzing spirit of bureaucracy. Political leaders should be answerable only to themselves, and so able to act autonomously. The abilities with which political leaders should oppose the bureaucratic apparatus can be acquired only in political struggle. In this connection the parliament exercises a rationalizing function, for through intensive work in its various committees parliament educates politicians in the realities of administration. It is, of course, of decisive importance for this education that it be a matter of a powerful working

parliament, since only then can a parliament serve as a proving ground, not for demagogues, but for politicians positively participating in government. Beyond that, a parliament sees to the continuity and the supervision of administrative exercise of power, contributes, vis-à-vis the leaders, to the preservation of civil rights, and assures peaceful elimination of the caesarist dictator once he has lost the trust of the masses (ibid., p. 1452).

The increase of possibilities of rational action which a society obtains through a strong parliament and a caesarist leader is, to be sure, small. For the rise to power of leaders has as a condition the political tutelage of the masses. The dialectic of bureaucratization does not stop at the portals of those institutions of democratic decision making, the political parties. As governing parties, their effectiveness is narrowly restricted by the governmental bureaucracy, while the scope for democratic decisions is severely limited by the party bureaucracy.

Weber discusses, with reference primarily to the Socialdemocratic Party of Germany (SPD), how possibilities of rational political action fall prey to the formal rationality of bureaucracy. SPD drew his attention, among other reasons, because it, more than any other party, makes use of bureaucratic organization to insure efficiency. At the same time, however, and in contradiction to its modern organizational form, it subscribes to a particular ideological program; it associates itself, in other words, with substantive demands. As a consequence of its fixation on, as Weber puts it, an 'ethics of brotherhood,' the SPD became isolated and, in spite of its bureaucratic apparatus, remains incapable of participating in real power politics. Only by abandoning substantive programs could the SPD become able to make use of its bureaucratic apparatus to take advantage of

opportunities in the power struggle by massive recruiting of followers. The smooth and effective functioning of this apparatus is, however, contingenet on the depolitization of the party's membership. For plebiscitary party leaders can use the apparatus in their struggle for power only when the members do as they are told. "In order to be a useful apparatus," observes Weber, the party must be "a machine in the American sense--undisturbed either by the vanity of notables or pretensions to independent views--the following of such a leader must obey him blindly" (Weber, 1946, p. 113).

Nothing would be gained by renouncing bureaucratization of the party for the sake of substantive programs and in order to preserve democracy within the party, since ideological rigidity only leads to isolation and non-bureaucratic organizational forms result in inefficiency. Under these conditions rational political considerations and decisions are possible only at the topmost level of the party organization, only for the party's political leaders. In Weber's view, modern democracy must make a choice "between leadership democracy (Führerdemokratie) with a 'machine' and leaderless democracy, namely, the rule of professional politicians without a calling, without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader, and this means what the party insurgents in the situation usually designate as 'the rule of the clique'" ("Politics as a Vocation," p. 113).

There is also no substitute for charismatic party leaders in the fight against the spirit of bureaucracy within parties. There this spirit is embodied by those party bureaucrats whose main occupation is being party bureaucrats. Such party bureaucrats, who do not live <u>for</u>, but rather <u>from</u> politics, all too easily subordinate party programs to the satisfaction of their personal needs and career interests. Such self-interest, says Weber,

had in his day not yet completely gained the upper hand in SPD for no other reason than that the party was socially isolated and its members had only limited access to public offices. The party once freed from this isolation, there would emerge and grow in it a stratum of members who in pursuing their material self-interests would trammel and render ineffective those who live for politics and commit themselves to achieving political goals. In Weber's own words:

> Even now certain contradictions are clearly apparent within the Social Democratic bureaucracy. And if the contradictions of the personal career interests of the professional politicians, on the one hand, and the revolutionary ideology on the other could develop with complete freedom, and further, if the veterans associations no longer wanted to expel Social Democrats, as they do now, if Social Democrats were accepted into the administrative boards of churches, from which they are now expelled, then and only then would the party begin to have serious internal problems. Only then would revolutionary virulence be seriously endangered, and only then would it become clear that in the long run this path does not lead to Social Democracy's conquest of cities and the state, that rather the reverse will happen; the state, will conquer the party. And I don't understand why bourgeois society as such should regard this as a danger.... (Weber, 1924, p. 409, trans. R. M.).

If opportunities for rational action still exist for anyone at all in capitalist society, then they exist for the entrepreneur and the charismatic leader. The calculability of their social environment, which capitalist society provides for them, is due to the deprivation of the majority of the opportunity to influence social life. Thus institutional safeguarding of formal rationality is not a condition of rational action in general or of freedom for all; it is rather a condition of freedom for the members of one class, whose autonomy is, admittedly, menaced as well in the extreme. About the capitalist character of this formal rationality Weber has left, as we have seen, not the slightest doubt.

IV. FORMAL RATIONALITY AND ZWECKRATIONALITÄT IN THE ECONOMY

Modern capitalism's political system of domination has, in Weber's terminology, the form of legal authority, whose positively enacted legal norms are imposed on those governed, together with plebiscitary 'leadership democracy.' Under these conditions, the masses' belief in the legitimacy of the authority governing them regresses, as Weber shows, to finally become custom, convention and belief in legality for its own sake, matters of which the individual is to a great extent not clearly aware. Questions about the meaning of the individual's existence and about the relationship between the individual and society--central themes of bourgeois ideology--disappear from the sphere of public life as topics of political discussion. According to Weber, the political order in this sense continues to be of concern only to isolated groups of the marginal political counterculture and to dogmatic sects. Contemporary examples are communist splinter groups and today's counterculture with its plethora of factions.

Now the elaboration of individual normative systems of orientation does not depend solely on what individuals learn through their experiences in the arena of public political activity. Of equally great importance for the consciousness of these individuals is what they are taught by the experience gained from their occupations. The connection between work and the individual's behavioral orientation in all other parts of his life is something that sociology is clearly aware of. A large number of empirical studies confirm that in all spheres of life behavioral orientation co-varies with socio-economic status. From a Marxist perspective this covariation manifests the connection between wage labor and the development of class

consciousness. Some authors of the traditional Left believe that in the course of technical rationalization individual jobs will become more complex and more interesting, and that the correspondingly better trained workers will also be better citizens, that is, they will have a higher level of political consciousness. In the non-Marxist discussion of this subject defenders of the professionalization thesis and the human capital theory come to similarly optimistic prognoses, although without the political evaluations of the Marxists. In contrast to these forecasts, Weber's assessment of what lies in store for workers is pessimistic. Among the more recent studies of the relationship between work freedom and individual qualifications, those done by authors of the New Left might approach most closely to Weber's position. These we will not treat here, though. We will limit ourselves to an examination of Weber's analysis of wage labor and, beyond that, to a discussion of only a few writings which refer directly to Weber's theories.

The rationality of behavioral orientations also provides the standpoint from which Weber investigates forms of economic activity. The continuum of increasing rationality formed by the emotional, affectual, traditional, value-rational and zweckrational types of action appears also in Weber's study of economic action.

The theme of Weber's economic sociology arises out of the question, which institutions and modes of action best fulfill the conditions for rational economic action? Weber defines economic action as "any peaceful exercise of an actor's control over resources which is in its main impulse oriented towards economic ends," that is, oriented towards "satisfaction of a desire for 'utilities' (Nutzleistungen)" (Weber, 1978, p. 63). Economic

action is rational when the selection of its ends and means is the result of deliberate planning. Rational planning of economic action implies that the actor is not restricted to meeting a fixed demand for some particular goods, but rather can respond to any demand; and furthermore that the economic action is not restricted to particular forms of providing goods, but instead that the actor can employ the most efficient procedures (ibid., p. 63 ff.).

It is characteristic of the measures typical of rational economic action that they are based on cost-benefit analyses. These analyses refer not only to the means that would be used to meet a demand, but also to the definition of the demand. Taking recourse, in a rather vague fashion, to the theory of marginal utility, Weber explains that the needs which call for satisfaction are to be hierarchically ordered according to their estimated importance. Decisions about the systematic allocation of disposable resources are made according to the priority of needs and to the costs of resources required for satisfying them. Such calculations obviously necessitate the evaluation and comparison of means and ends in quantitative terms because economic processes are comparable and hence calculable to the degree to which they are susceptible of quantification. Weber uses the term 'formal rationality' of economic action to designate "the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied." A system of economic activity is formally rational "according to the degree in which the provision for needs, which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, and is so expressed" (ibid., p. 85).

Formal rationality, the calculability of all processes, is then an indispensable precondition of purposively rational economic action. Therefore

the safeguarding of a formally rational economic orientation is synonomous with the preservation of Zweckrationalität and the protection of enlightened, autonomous behavior.

This connection between formal rationality and Zweckrationalität is the background against which Weber examines all the institutions which are usually associated with the concept of the free market economy and asks how this economic order makes possible a maximum of formal rationality. The train of Weber's reflections on this topic goes as follows.

The most perfect means of economic calculation, from a purely technical point of view, is money, and therefore calculation in terms of money is the specific means for rational economic action (ibid., p. 86). It is a premise of bourgeois economics that goods are always in short supply, and that rational economic action is consequently always aimed at obtaining additional resources, that it is expansive and profit-making (erwerbswirtschaftlich) in character. From these two characteristics taken together, it follows that in the rationalization of economic action to the highest degree calculation in terms of money assumes the form of capital accounting: the valuation and verification of opportunities for profit and of the success of profit making in terms of money. Competition between independent economic agents in the free market and all the other institutions which confer on 'profit-making' (Erwerben) the structure of capital accumulation form the institutional foundation of formal rationality.

> Money accounting attains the highest level of rationality, as an instrument of calculatory orientation of economic action, when it is applied in the form of capital accounting. The substantive precondition here is a thorough market freedom, that is, the absence of monopolies, both of the imposed and economically irrational and of the voluntary and economically rational (i.e., marketoriented) varieties....Strict capital accounting is further

> associated with the social phenomena of "shop discipline" and appropriation of the means of production, and that means: with the existence of a 'system of domination' (Herrschaftsverhältnis) (ibid., p. 108).

The separation of workers from the means of production is indispensable for two reasons. Modern factories engaged in large-scale production require large work forces. On grounds of technical efficiency, therefore, individual ownership of small-sized means of production, no matter what form this ownership might take, is out of the question (ibid., p. 137). This circumstance, however, does not exclude collective ownership of the means of production. Weber grounds the necessity that ownership of the means of production must be denied to the workers as a collective on the following considerations. Only free wage labor permits an enterprise:

(a) to select workers strictly from the standpoint of productivity;

(b) to decide freely the way in which the workers are employed;

(c) to place outside the enterprise and to shift onto the family and the state the reproduction of the work force, which is necessarily a matter of substantive concerns;

(d) and to use for disciplinary purposes the workers' dependence on their wages for their livelihood; and

(e) finally, capital, the disposition over which is unhampered by workers' rights to participate in management, is thought to be especially 'safe' and hence is of superior credit-worthiness.

Thus, if the calculability of economic processes and the discipline of the workers is to be preserved, a change in property relations can only take the form of an increasing centralization of capital (ibid., p. 139).

Interest in the maintenance of the formal rationality which is so important for individual freedom requires that substantively irrational consequences of the capitalist system be accepted. One must accept the lack of guarantees that formal rationality and substantive rationality will coincide

in the result of economic activity. "Substantive and formal (in the sense of exact calculation) rationality are," states Weber, "...after all largely distinct problems. This fundamental and, in the last analysis, unavoidable element of irrationality in economic system is one of the important sources of all 'social' problems, and above all, of the problems of socialism" (ibid., p. 111). As we have seen, one instance of this substantive irrationality is that "the maximum of formal rationality in capital accounting is possible only where the workers are subjected to domination by entrepreneurs" (ibid., p. 138).

The formal rationality provided by the capitalist economy allows rational economic action to prevail more easily in that type of economy than in any other forms of economic organization. But this observation does not tell us anything about the absolute extent of autonomy and rationality which this economic form assures to the individuals living in it. The relationship between individuals and economic institutions is directly relevant to the topics with which we are concerned: the development of crises of legitimacy and the function of education and training. For this reason let us consider which individual orientations of behavior correspond, in Weber's opinion, to the capitalist organization of labor.

V. DISCIPLINE AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE

Weber investigated three occupational groups in detail: workers, in his sociology of economic action; bureaucrats, in his theory of bureaucracy; and in his speech, "Science as a Vocation," university professors. Weber describes the skill requirements which these occupational groups have to meet in modern enterprises, in public institutions, and in scientific

teaching and research, as a certain kind of subjective meaning attached to individual action, more precisely, as a specific form of discipline and as technical knowledge. Let us begin with the relationship of industrial workers to their work.

In Weber's sociology of economic action there are numerous passages which affirm that the institutional mechanisms for safeguarding formal rationality not only bring forth instances of substantive irrationality, but also deprive the workers in the plants of individual autonomy. Moreover, capitalism increasingly reduces the chances which workers have to orient their behavior in a formally rational manner. To be sure, in the market the individuals orient their activity autonomously--in contrast to the heteronomously oriented economic action of the planned economy. However, the unequal distribution of the means of production establishes relationships of substantive heteronomy in capitalism also.

Opportunities for rational economic action are available to owners of commodities, including owners of the commodity labor power, even if for the latter rationality assumes the character of passive conformity to the constraints of the labor market. For most workers the dialectic of rationalization goes on further. Within economic enterprises and bureaucratic organizations the mechanisms of the free market do not obtain. Here we don't find autonomous participants in the market who enter into exchange relations; rather workers must follow instructions and accept substantive constraints which are institutionalized in the form of machinery and bureaucratic regulations. Once inside enterprises workers are no longer subjects, but rather labor power under contract, and as such objects of the disposition of others. On this fate of workers under capitalism Weber comments:

> In a planned economy, all economic action, so far as "planning" is really carried through, is oriented heteronomously and in a strictly "budgetary" manner, to rules which enjoin certain modes of action and forbid others, and which establish a system of rewards and punishments. When, in a planned economy, the prospect of additional individual income is used as a means of stimulating self-interest, the type and direction of the action thus rewarded is substantively heteronomously determined. It is possible for the same thing to be true of a market economy, though in a formally voluntary way. This is true wherever the unequal distribution of wealth, and particularly of capital goods, forces the non-owning group to comply with the authority of others in order to obtain any return at all for the utilities they can offer on the market.... In a purely capitalistic organization of production, this is the fate of the entire working class (ibid., p. 109-110, my emphasis, G. L.).

Weber's description of workers' substantive dependence differs hardly at all from that of Marx, for he describes it too as subordination to a repressive form of division of labor:

To this form of organization of the labor process there corresponds a particular kind of work commitment. Workers' motivation is not due to direct physical coercion; rather entrepreneurs make use of workers' self-interest to motivate them. Under the conditions of a capitalist economy, however, this self-interest consists in hardly more than in the interest in satisfying material needs, which, as a rule, can be done only through wage labor. Work motivation acquires a value-rational moment only from the worker's extra-economic altruistic concern for his own family. Intrinsic work motivation can only be assumed when it is a question of skilled work from which satisfaction can be derived. Yet, to obviate this kind of work is precisely the aim of the Taylorist work organization and its modern branches. "Whenever technical specialization has reached high levels," remarks Weber, "the extreme monotony of operations tends to limit incentives to wage considerations....In the capitalistic system, the most immediate bases of willingness to work are opportunities for high piece-rate earnings and the danger

of dismissal" (Weber, 1978, p. 151). For the cultivation of affectual, traditional or value-rational work motivation the necessary social structures are lacking. Where these attitudes do exist, it is difficult to manage labor on a rational basis (Cf. ibid.).

That the modern orientation to work is characterized by indifference to the content of the work is also the theme of Weber's treatise on the 'Protestant Ethic.' His interest in the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism is not limited to the significance of religious belief for the emergence of modern capitalism. He is interested also in the fate of the Protestant ethic in the course of capitalism's development. In the well known dictum at the end of this essay, Weber observes that capitalism, which originated, among other things, from ethical maxims of individuals, has become largely independent of any meaning individuals attach to their action. In Weber's own words:

> The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so....Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer (Protestant Ethic, p. 182-183).

Employers as well as workers are eliminated without fail, if they do not submit to the socio-structural constraints of the capitalist economic order. In contrast to capitalism's early days, the internalization of ethical maxims is now no longer a necessary condition for the existence of this economic order. Not by internalized constraints is the individual's economic action determined today, but by constraints which are increasingly external to him.

The driving forces of social development are no longer to be found in the individuals of a society but rather in the society's structure. A particular orientation of individuals' action no longer generates the rationalization process, but instead human action is determined in its orientation by that reified process. And although this dependency of individual action on a social structure external to it destroys traditional value systems, it does not, bring about more rational orientations of action. Speaking of bureaucratic rationalization, Weber says that it often has been

> a major revolutionary force with regard to tradition. But it revolutionizes with technical means, in principle, as does every economic re-organization, 'from without': It first changes the material and social orders, and through them the people, by changing the conditions of adaptation, through a rational determination of means and ends (Weber, 1978, p. 1116).

To the revolutionizing of society by extra-individual forces Weber contrasts a kind of social development which has its driving force within the individual. This type of society-changing orientation of action he calls charisma, and capitalism in its early stages is one of the many historical instances which Weber examines in his discussion of the nature of charisma and the forms in which it has appeared in history. Contrasting the revolutionary power of charisma with bureaucratic rationalization, Weber declares that the former

> rests upon the belief in revealation and heroes, upon the conviction that certain manifestations - whether they be of a religious, ethical, artistic, scientific, political, or other kind - are important and valuable; it rests upon "heroism" of an ascetic, military, judicial, magical or whichever kind. Charismatic belief revolutionizes men "from within" and shapes material and social conditions according to its revolutionary will (ibid., p. 1116).

As the rationalization of social and economic relations proceeds, the rational basis of the conditions in which they live and work becomes ever

remote for those governed. The process of social rationalization, argues Weber, does not by any means affect "universalization of knowledge of the conditions and the interconnections of collective action..., but rather in most cases just the opposite. The 'savage' knows infinitely more about the social and economic conditions of his own existence than someone who is, in the usual sense of the word, 'civilized' (WL, p. 472, trans. R. M.).

In this regard the civilized person is distinguished from the savage only by his knowledge that the conditions in which he lives and works are human artifacts and are not subject to the control of any non-human authority. The civilized person can, moreover, be confident that these conditions will function in a certain way and that they are therefore calculable for him. The social integration of the masses depends less and less on their belief in the legitimacy of modern bureaucratic society. They simply comply with the social order without questioning its legitimacy. Weber calls this orientation 'discipline,' and states, "the content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswerving by and exclusively set for carrying out the command (Weber, 1978, p. 1149).

Weber understood very well that not all jobs are subjected to Taylorism to the degree that those of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in production and administration are. The execution of some tasks, among which are those of bureaucratic administration, presupposes technical knowledge. "Bureaucratic administration," he states, "means fundamentally domination through knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational" (ibid., p. 225). With the development of modern bureaucratic administration,

technical knowledge has become a dominant type of behavioral orientation, and no other form of organization procures greater importance for technical competence than bureaucracy.

The formula 'domination through knowledge', or the synonomous expression 'professional authority', has given rise to debates in the sociology of bureaucracy and also in organizational theory about how the relationship between 'domination through formal competence'--competence bestowed by one's position--and 'domination through knowledge' should be conceived. According to the debaters, it is unclear how Weber wanted the relationship between these two kinds of domination to be understood, and the opinion has been widely held that the bureaucratic type of authority was, as a type, not self-consistent. The concepts formal competence and professional authority, as Schluchter interprets them, designate "two types of authority and so stand for two forms of organized, that is, institutionalized power" (Schluchter, p. 146, trans. R. M.). Many years before Schluchter's interpretation, Parsons wrote in his introduction to Weber's theory of bureaucracy: "It is the present writer's opinion that [Weber] has thrown together two essentially different types [of social structure]." Parsons calls these types "coercive powers" and "professional authority" (Parsons, p. 58 ff).

In this Weberian tradition stands also Alvin Gouldner, who describes bureaucracy as "a Janus-faced organization, looking two ways at once. On the one side it was administration based on expertise; while on the other it was administration based on discipline" (Gouldner, p. 19-24). The question whether Weber's concept of bureaucracy is in fact like a Janus head has been discussed at length in Germany by Hartmann. From detailed exegesis of Weber's writings he concludes that Weber's arguments for professional expertise being the foundation of bureaucratic legitimacy are vague

lack cogency. Therefore it would be more correct "to see Weber's contribution to the analysis of professional expertise in the bureaucratic organization as consisting almost exclusively in his description of the instrumental ('technical') capability of this expertise" (Hartmann, p. 45, trans. R. M.). Hartmann stresses that professional expertise of course plays a role in the recruitment of personnel and also affects the quality of their performance as bureaucrats. There is, though, according to Hartmann in Weber's writings no necessary connection between professional expertise and the legitimation of bureaucratic action (Hartmann, p. 42). After showing that domination through knowledge was a type of authority unknown to Weber, Hartmann himself sets about contrasting legal bureaucratic authority with another type of authority, one characterized by a special belief in legitimacy founded on professional expertise. With his elaboration of this type of professional authority Hartmann wants to remedy a short-coming of Weber's taxonomy.

I shall take issue with the contention that bureaucratic authority is Janus-faced, and that domination through knowledge is an alternative type to domination through formal competence. For it can be clearly demonstrated that Weber related technical knowledge and bureaucracy in an unequivocal way. Technical knowledge is a type of behavioral orientation which is institutionalized in the form of modern bureaucracy. In Weber's theory of bureaucracy, domination through knowledge and domination through formal competence refer to the same thing, and they do so in a consistent way.

The distinction between domination through knowledge and domination through formal competence could be made on the basis of the relationship

between the one exercising domination and the foundation of his authority. In the case of domination through knowledge this foundation lies in the person of the one possessing technical knowledge. For technical expertise is a personal attribute, and the expert retains his knowledge even when he loses his position. The person of the expert is apparently inseparable from his implements of work: he possesses them inherently. In the case of domination through formal competence, the foundation of authority lies unquestionably in the structure of the organization in which the one exercising domination has his position. The foundation of his authority is wholly external to him. With his position he loses the prerequisite for his authority. This is part of what Weber meant when he repeatedly stressed that the occupational situation of the bureaucratic official is similar to that of the wage laborer, in so far as both are expropriated from the means of their work.

If one wants to show that the expressions domination through knowledge and domination through formal competence refer to the same social phenomenon, then it must be proven that the experts, too, are separated from the means of their work. In other words, it must be proven that in their work process they can express nothing of themselves as unique individuals, that technical knowledge does not admit of individualized expression, and that therefore technical knowledge is structured in its quality and in the manner of its application just as the work of wage laborers or bureaucratic officials. In Marxist terms our thesis is that experts possess technical knowledge, but they cannot appropriate it; that technical knowledge is itself an expression of the alienation of the cultural and material resources of work from the professional.

To formulate in this way the question of the relationship between authority by virtue of formal competence and authority by virtue of knowledge might, at first glance, appear trivial. For is technical knowledge anything more than a tracing out of the relations between things, which in the way are constituted have nothing at all to do with social relationships or with individuals? If that were so, than individuals and social relationships would be completely exterior to technical knowledge and would come into play only when the question is raised of the ends which the experts' work serves.

Yet, according to Weber, technical knowledge is not a purely objective description of purely non-social material qualities of objects, but rather a relationship between individuals and their environment. Technical knowledge means a certain kind of meaningful orientation with respect to one's environment. It is a characteristic of this orientation that it distinguishes between means and ends, a distinction which is itself only an achievement of the historical process of rationalization. Only when the rationalization process has reached the stage of value-rational orientations of action can the question be posed of which means are to be used for given ends. By the pair of concepts, ends and means, Weber designates a particular meaning which individuals associate with their behavior. This differentiation in the meaning of individuals' behavior is connected only indirectly with the natural properties of things or the relationships between them.

In his political writings, Weber refers even to such a solid object as a machine as 'mind objectified', and goes on to say that "only this provides it with the power to force men into its service and to dominate their every-day working life as completely as is actually the case in the

factory" (Weber, 1978, p. 1402). It is hard to imagine a definition of technical knowledge and its objectifications further removed from technocratic ideologies.

Weber assigns professional knowledge to the technical sphere, to the sphere of means, for it designates a way of viewing things that considers the world as a means. Of special significance in this regard is Weber's characterization of the relationship between means and ends:

> The use of the term 'progress' is legitimate in our disciplines when it refers to 'technical' problems, for example to the 'means' of attaining an unambiguously given end. It can never elevate itself into the sphere of 'ultimate' evaluations" (The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 38).

From Weber's statement one can conclude that any phenomenon becomes a means only when it is placed in a relationship to a determinate end, to the realization of which the phenomenon is supposed to contribute. Thus the two ways of looking at things, corresponding to the concepts of end and technology, do not simply stand side by side with no connection, and in the relationship obtaining between them these two ways of viewing things are not without determinative influence on one another.

The quality which this relationship assumes depends on the stage attained by the rationalization process. In the case of value-rational orientations of behavior, individuals' action is zweckrational only with respect to the choice of means; the question then is, which means are best suited to realize given ends. These ends are undisputable and hence place substantive limits on the development of technology. A value-rational orientation precludes to redefine ends according to technical possibilities which might become available in the course of rationalization.

This barrier is eliminated by capitalism which dissipates value-rational orientations of behavior. The formal rationality of the market is open to a wider range of substantive ends and allows for more flexibility in the definition of objectives the technical progress should serve. Only with this increased rationality does it become possible, not only to organize means according to the requirements for particular ends, but also the reverse, to set ends in accordance with the resources at one's disposal. This variability in the relation between ends means does not imply that the development of technology proceeds independent from ends, for example along the path of a purely technological logic. Weber leaves no doubt that the direction of technical development is always determined by the structure of the society. Under capitalism these determinants are constituted by the market. Technological progress will, after all, hardly serve ends which are not sanctioned by the market or by the politically powerful.

As Weber puts it: "From the economic point of view 'technical' questions always involve the consideration of 'costs'." And he emphasizes the fact that "today every technician is accustomed to (take account of the relative scarcity of materials) even in the chemical laboratory, the action is no longer in the present sense, purely technical, but <u>also</u> economic" (Weber, 1978, p. 66).

Technical knowledge and technological progress appear to be governed by non-social, objective necessity only because the ends their development serves have taken on the rather abstract form of profit, which is open not to any but to a wide range of substantive goals. These ends are to a large extent taboo as subjects of public discussion. And where technical knowledge

finds its application, in privately owned factories and public institutions, property relations preclude that workers pursue ends other than those institutionalized in their formal competencies. From experts one requires objectivity; and objectivity means that neither the expert himself nor those administered by the bureaucracies may as subjects enter into the expert's considerations. Those governed appear as cases with which the bureaucratic official concerns himself sine ira et studio, that is, without personal commitment and without considering the material consequences for the people he is dealing with. Of course, the experts as well as those whom they administer are subjects. The bureaucracy, however, brings the two groups together in a relationship that is 'objective' in nature, as if they were objects completely lacking an individuality.

Relations of domination are expressed not only by the tasks which the experts in formal law and in bureaucratic regulations must carry out. The operation of technical installations, of machinery, is also social in nature, for machinery is a human artifact which bears the imprint of the ends for which it was made. In Weber's words, machinery is 'mind objectified'. How it must be operated is determined by the ends whose realization it is meant to serve and which are embodied in its physical characteristics.

One of the examples Weber uses to elucidate the connection between technical procedures and institutionalized ends is the conflict which arises when the expert receives instructions contradicting his own conception of what the appropriate procedure is. In such instances the expert must abandon his own opinion and carry out his orders as if they corresponded to his convictions. Now the requirement of obedience to commands does not preclude discussion between superior and subordinate on technical matters.

However, the result of such discussions cannot be that axioms for the making of decisions which conflict with the maintenance of bureaucratic authority or with profit-making are validated and made operative. If the functional capability of the bureaucratic apparatus is not to be impaired, then the only permissible question is how to fulfill the requirements for the functioning of this apparatus in a fashion appropriate to its ends. And one of these functional requirements is that neither the expert nor those governed enter into consideration for the bureaucratic apparatus as subjects.

It is, then, a characteristic of the modern work orientation which Weber calls technical knowledge that the experts accept without reservation the legitimacy of the authority to which they subordinate, and limit their questions to asking with which means the ends of this authority, its dictates, can be realized most effectively. The experts' renunciation of questioning the ends or the legitimacy of authority confers on their behavior qua experts and on the qualifications which suit them for their work as experts a technical character. In this sense bureaucratic officials are technical experts. The terms 'bureaucrat' and 'expert' are synonymous. "The modern official receives a professional training which unavoidably increases in correspondence with the rational technology of modern life" (ibid., p. 1401). This depolitization of the bureaucratic personnel's behavioral orientation is, then, secured by the separation of the office from the person and by the material dependency of the official on his superior. In the expropriation of the means of their work, the occupational situations of the bureaucrats is similar to that of wage laborers (ibid., p. 1394).

That they must orient their behavior in a purely instrumental, technical manner is a fate which experts share with wage laborers. The only difference between wage laborers and experts is that the latter must deal with technical questions in larger areas and possess more technical knowledge than the former. The experts are not free, though, to dispose over this technical knowledge as they will, and there is no question of their making use of it for their own ends or for ends in opposition to the authority to which they are subordinate.

Consequently, Weber does not employ the formulae: domination through formal competence and domination through knowledge, to designate two different types of authority. It is a matter, rather, of two concepts which refer to the same phenomenon, namely the relationship of alienation obtaining in bureaucracies between workers and the means for their work. The concept of 'domination through formal competence' describes this relationship from its subjective side, the side of the worker's qualification which corresponds to his being expropriated.

VI. BUREAUCRATIZATION AND EDUCATION

As we have seen, the progress of bureaucratization is accompanied by a change in the relation of individuals to the social and economic conditions of their life, such that the external living conditions increasingly take on a reified character, that is, become ever more like an object on which individuals have ever less influence, although they, in fact, produce these conditions. In this development individuals in their personal uniqueness play an ever smaller role. According to Weber, technical knowledge and impersonal discipline, which he also terms <u>dressage</u>, become the subjective correlate of this social structure:

> It is the fate of charisma to recede before the powers of tradition or of rational association after it has entered the permanent structures of social action. This waning of charisma generally indicates the diminishing importance of individual action. In this respect, the most irresistable force is rational discipline, which eradicates not only personal charisma but also stratification by status groups, or at least transforms them in a rationalizing direction.
>
> The content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command (ibid., p. 1148-1149).

The reification of social relations is reflected in education. Between the system of domination and the content of education, there is, in Weber's theory, a close connection: educational goals are determined by the kind of administration through which an authority expresses itself (ibid., p. 264-265). This assertion does not refer to political decisions about carrying out educational programs, but rather to affinities between the structure of a system of domination and the structure of educational processes under that system.

Weber describes the reification of social relations using the diametrically opposite types of charismatic and formally-rational orientations of action. Cultivation of charisma and rational technical training are, accordingly, types of education which correspond to this process of reification. Emphatically contrasting them, Weber states:

> In the area of educational goals, the most extreme opposites which have occurred in history are: the stimulation of charisma (heroic qualities and magical powers), on the one hand, and the imparting of technical training to specialists, on the other (Religionssoziolgie, p. 408, trans. R. M.).

Between the stimulation of charisma and specialized technical training there is a kind of education corresponding to the traditional type of authority. Weber describes its purpose as the rearing up to the norms of a

way of living as they are institutionalized with the social estates. The cultivation of a style of living which this kind of education engages in follows traditional norms which deny importance to usefulness and efficiency, and hence to technology:

> Such education may have been aimed at a knightly or at an ascetic type, at a literary type (as in China) or at a gymnastic-humanist type (as in Hellas), or at a conventional "gentleman" type of the Anglo-Saxon variety. A personality "cultivated" in this sense formed the educational ideal stamped by the structure of domination and the conditions of membership in the ruling stratum of the society in question. The qualification of this ruling stratum rested upon the possession of a "plus" of such cultural quality (in the quite variable and value-neutral sense of the term as used here), rather than upon a "plus" of expert knowledge (Weber, 1978, p. 1001).

Discipline, as Weber shows, is impersonal and neutral ('sachlich') and it places itself at the disposal of any power that knows how to use it. In its essence discipline is alien to charisma and to honor founded on status. But discipline is in accordance with technical knowledge insofar as both behavioral orientations do not give any recognition to points of view which regard the individual as a personal subject and attach no importance to his personal development. Technical knowledge as a behavioral orientation sacrifices the personal for the sake of the social structure and the material conditions of life, which remain beyond the control of influence of individuals.

In contrast with technical knowledge, it is characteristic of the cultivation of charisma that it pays no heed to the social and material conditions of life, directing itself instead, in an irrational fashion, to drawing forth heroic qualities. These two diametrically opposed types of education have, then, as a distinctive feature, that they each ignore one pole of the relationship between the individual and his environment.

Modern educational institutions, Weber maintains, and above all those of the tertiary level, are coming under the pervasively dominant influence of bureaucratized society. These institutions equip first and foremost the individuals with technical knowledge. Education today becomes more and more specialized technical training:

> Behind all the present discussions about the basic questions of the educational system there lurks decisively the struggle of the "specialist" type of man against the older type of the "cultivated man," a struggle conditioned by the irresistably expanding bureaucratization of all public and private relations of authority and by the ever-increasing importance of experts and specialized knowledge. This struggle affects the most intimate aspects of personal culture (ibid., p. 1002).

The systematized technical training of specialists furthers and hinders at the same time the democratization of society. On the one hand, along with the educational system the principle of advancement according to merit becomes institutionalized, which means that claims to privileges based on status become less effective. On the other hand, however,--and this Weber warns against--schools buttress the system of social strata and contribute to making these strata impermeable. The expansion of the educational system is due not least of all to interest in securing a favorable social status, and by no means to "a suddenly awakened 'thirst for education' (ibid., p. 1000). Whoever wants to obtain access to a better job finds it more necessary today than ever before to attend schools in order to acquire diplomas, whereas those who are secure in their occupational status find that it is in their best interest to limit the supply of candidates for their kinds of jobs. A widespread way of doing this is monopolization of certain occupational positions for the holders of educational patents (ibid.).

To that must be added that the social significance of equality of educational opportunity is very limited, even where it has been achieved to a

high degree. For equality of opportunity in the educational system does not amount to anything more than equality of opportunity in competition for the unequal life-opportunities of the bureaucratic society. And if one can believe Weber's thesis that the rationalization process is reducing occupational skill requirements even further and is depriving all individuals of the chance to express themselves in their uniqueness in their work, then it is certain in any case that universal human equality will come to pass. This equality, however, will consist in the universalization of powerlessness in the face of the bureaucratized social apparatuses, and not in the abolition of power and domination, which would bring about the universalization of individual autonomy.

It is of greater relevance for the question for the functioning of democracy that the technical training of specialists excludes discussion of the ends which the students will one day serve. To be an expert means that one does not call into question the ends in whose service one's knowledge is placed.

Schools do not, of course, strive only to impart specialized technical knowledge. The education which schools seek to give is also supposed to be general education. It is not the purpose of general education to be useful, but instead to contribute to the cultural stylization of the individual's life, a purpose which is reminiscent of the goals of traditional education. Since the process of rationalization has destroyed the traditional norms which defined what was to be considered as a 'cultivated' style of living, it is not clear what the content of general education today can actually be. The public knows that a consensus about cultural norms for the style of living is lacking, and many also know that there can be no return to the

authority of traditions. Under these circumstances what can be expected from formal instruction that does not want to reduce Zweckrationalität to instrumental rationality?

In his speech, "Science as a Vocation," Weber definitively rejected all attempts made in the name of science to answer the question of how people ought to live. When cultural norms have lost their validity and force, and when the revelations of charismatic leaders find no credence, then thousands of professors, as petty prophets hired and privileged by the state, will also not be able to establish in their lecture-halls a new order which will give an answer to the question of the meaning of the individual's existence. Should the professors attempt to proclaim positive social norms, their attempts would, says Weber, have chiefly the following effect:

> All they will accomplish is to show that they are unaware of the decisive state of affairs: the prophet for whom so many of our younger generation yearn simply does not exist. But this knowledge in its forceful significance has never become vital for them. The inward interest of a truly religiously 'musical' man can never be served by veiling to him and to others the fundamental fact that he is destined to life in a godless and prophetless time by giving him the ersatz of armchair prophecy ("Science as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, p. 153).

For Weber it is incontestable that science has no response to the question of the meaning of the individual's existence. But he also believes that science is not irrelevant to humans' efforts to come to an understanding with themselves regarding what they, as humans, are about, their efforts to answer the question of what they should do and how they should live. As science cannot answer this question, says Weber, "The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives 'no' answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly" (ibid., p. 143).

With the methods of science it is, to be sure, impossible to establish positive norms for human action, but with the help of science one can achieve clarity about what one does, about the preconditions, the implications and the consequences of a contemplated action, and one can do this not only with regard to the selection of means, but also with regard to the definition of ends. For science can say: "In terms of its meaning, such and such a practical stand can be derived with inner consistency, and hence integrity, from this or that ultimate weltanschauliche position...but it cannot be derived from these or those other positions." "Science," Weber goes on, "can force the individual, or at least---can help him, to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct. This appears to me as not so trifling a thing to do, even for the individual's purely personal life" (ibid., p. 152, slightly amended, R. M.). It is this sense that scientifically guided formal instruction can contribute to the shedding of light on the predominantly irrational foundations of the legitimacy of modern relations of domination. Formal instruction cannot provide an alternative foundation for legitimacy, neither one of which the existing relations of domination would rest more securely, nor one which would serve as the basis for a new social order, yet to be fashioned.

According to Weber, a significance going beyond the personal fate of the individual cannot be ascribed to education. In his opinion there is no alternative to the bureaucratic society; he considered bureaucratization inescapable, and he saw socialism merely as a further advance in the development of the Western rationality already embodied by capitalism. Nor did he believe that the structures of capitalism were endangered by crises of legitimacy. The erosion of the rationality of general political consciousness is

not synonomous with a social crisis of legitimacy. For, as we have seen, this, in large measure irrational, public consciousness corresponds to the mode in which public and private bureaucracies function. Their functioning allows hardly any latitude for individual variation of behavior and therefore individual qualifications and hence education have only a limited impact upon bureaucracies. It is, though, just as obvious that the predominantly irrational political orientations which are widespread at present constitute a foundation for legitimacy that is extraordinarily labile. Election campaigns in which simple propagandistic means are used to attract voters to leaders who do not represent serious political programs are a relatively innocuous expression of the irrationality of public politics. However, that the irrational basis for legitimacy of authority in modern society holds dangers far more grave can be seen from National Socialism in Germany, in which the masses' belief in the charisma of a leader played a most pernicious role.

The regression of political rationality in the public sphere does not result in acute crises of legitimacy. The political system is therefore not forced to take measures which would give it a more stable basis of legitimacy. Moreover, governmental and private bureaucracies function better when they are dealing with depoliticized citizens than when the masses are politicized, no matter what ideology they might adhere to.

It is, in any case, questionable whether schools could undertake to do anything against the instability of public rationality. If one accepts Weber's conclusions, then schools ought to teach youth to do without gods and prophets, that is, to take responsibility for themselves. For example,

schools would make a constructive contribution to the safeguarding of public political rationality if they destroyed the authority of the religious and ideological dogma which in political propaganda, in the media and in everyday life in general has already lost much of its credibility. But then one would, of course, have to expect as part of the bargain that the youth would also call the authority of the schools into question and would refuse obedience to the curriculum, the school regulations, and the teachers. For the passivity into which schools force youth can hardly be legitimated in any reasonable way. The current discussion of the custodial function of schools indicates, in any case, a very important aspect of the function of schools, namely, to prevent the young from developing their own interests in freedom from regulation by bureaucratic authority. As a custodial institution, the school is just as much an element of the rationalization process as it is in its role of the agency which imparts technical knowledge to specialists. And, further, as part of 'the shell of bondage' which modern technology and the bureaucratic organization of social and economic relations have fabricated, the school suppresses charisma, autonomy, and spontaneity in its charges.

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